The blog entry is a little difficult to write, because the topic makes laymen cringe, and think that lawyers deal in a parallel reality.  But our job is not to justify why Courts and lawyers look at issues a certain way, but to simply report “as it is.”

The proposition of law we share today is:

We don’t actually mean the deadlines set forth in contracts unless we use the magic words “Time is of the essence.”  

Mays v. Hartman81 Ohio App. 40877 N.E.2d 93 (1st Dist, 1947).

Let’s re-visit that proposition again.  When a contract sets forth dates for the performance of obligations of parties to the contract, we don’t mean those dates — but rather “on or about those dates” — unless the contract expressly states, using these magic words, that “time is of the essence.”

So, extending this principle to both residential and commercial real estate contracts, if we say the seller will close on June 30, we mean “on a date reasonably close to June 30.”  If we say that a buyer has 90 days to complete his due diligence inspections of real estate, we mean “a date roughly in proximity to 90 days from contract signing.”

Now, as to the standard Cincinnati Area Board of Realtors purchase contract form in general use for residential transactions in the greater Cincinnati marketplace today (read your own form to be sure), time is NOT generally of the essence, as to closing date and certain other deadlines, but it IS of the essence as to (i) the inspection contingency deadline (Section 13) and (ii) surrender of possession of the real estate (Section 20).

Contrary to much of contract law, which generally applies a practical common sense interpretation to contract language, as to deadlines in contracts, “time is not of the essence,” unless the contract expressly says it is.

These words, “time is of the essence,” are some of the few “magic words” to which courts give special meaning.

An axiom frequently taught to real estate agents and investors is “It takes one to buy and two to sell.”  And that is in part true, but in part not true.  As with many axioms, “it’s just not that simple.”

First, what does the axiom mean?  In contract negotiations, one might have married couples, or even business partners, involved as buyers or sellers,  The question this saying attempts to answer is “who has authority to sell” the real estate; “who has authority to buy” the real estate?

The seller’s side of the equation

As a general proposition, if a property is owned by two parties (spouses or tenants in common), it takes the signature of both of them to effectuate a sale.  If we are going to legally enforce a contract for the sale of 1234 Main Street, you can only do that if both or all of the owners have signed the purchase contract.  Thus, the shorthand saying “it takes two to sell.”

That begs a different question, however, which is if one person makes a promise that he is unable to keep (e.g., a husband promises to sell a house, but the wife refuses to consent to sell her half and won’t sign the deed), what is liability for the party who made the promise?  In short, even though the buyer cannot succeed in vesting full title in himself in an action for Specific Performance, the buyer could still sue the seller for beaching his promise to deliver good title to the property.  In other words, the single seller who cannot perform could still be on the hook for money damages for his failure to perform on the contract.

This concept is enhanced by two specific provisions of the Cincinnati Area Board of Realtors standard form of residential purchase contract:

  • Section 6 has this: “Seller also represents that those signing this Contract constitute all of the owners of the title to the real property and other items as listed in Section 5, together with their respective spouses.”
  • Section 19 has this: “Seller…shall convey marketable title to the Real Estate by deed of general warranty or fiduciary deed, if applicable, in fee simple absolute, with release of dower.”

Section 6 is frankly confusing in its wording.  Does the contract require the signature of the spouses to be enforceable?  It seems to lend itself to both interpretations.

Section 19 on the other hand says clear that the person signing the contract as seller commits to deliver a good deed “with release of dower.”  To me that means that the seller is promising that if his wife or her husband’s signature is required, they will obtain it.  It is not the buyer’s problem to obtain a second signature to secure that promise or performance.

Further, while we point out that the incomplete seller (only one-half of a married couple, for example) could be on the hook for money damages in the event of his failure to perform on his promises, it is equally true that the non-signing seller cannot be forced to execute a deed just because their spouse promised that performance.

As a practical matter, what does that mean?  Well, several things:

  • Only money damages are available for the signing seller’s breach.
  • The remedy of “specific performance,” i.e., forcing a non-signing and recalcitrant seller to convey legal title to the property cannot be obtained in that circumstance.
  • However, a buyer could still “foul the title” to the property by filing an affidavit of matters relating to title or a lis pendens lawsuit claiming in interest in the real estate due to the seller’s breach.  Thus, even though the buyer cannot judicially force the seller’s performance, he also can prevent the seller from conveying clear title to anyone else.  In that circumstance, we end up with an old-fashioned standoff.

The buyer’s side of the equation

We then have the buyer’s side of the equation.  Can a buyer, married or not, buy property on his own?  Certainly.  A single buyer — without his spouse’s  or business partner’s consent can, in his own name, buy real property.  Thus, the saying “it takes one to buy.”

This means that if a married buyer signs a contract to purchase real estate and later has his wings clipped by a recalcitrant wife who refuses to sign, he still can legally be held to that contract either in an action for specific performance or for monetary damages. And it does not excuse his performance that his wife will not sign.

Then, this begs yet another question: Can the buyer finance that purchase?  Well, for a married person to borrow money to buy real property requires the spouse’s signature on the mortgage for purposes of releasing her dower interest.  So, contrary to the axiom, it may take “two to buy.”  Now, if the buyer can pay cash or obtain a loan that is not secured by a mortgage, then he can buy on his own. But, otherwise, “it also takes two to buy.”

Finally, a buyer may be able to avoid his obligations under a contract if his spouse refuses to participate in the mortgage application process, but that is a more complicated legal analysis.  It will depend on the contract language and the facts.

 

Occasionally we have a client either pursuing or defending against the payment of a fee for professional services rendered in conjunction with the sale of a piece of real property in Ohio, essentially a real estate commission.

One prerequisite that is not always met by the claimant, however, is licensure as a real estate broker.  It may be an accountant, attorney, or other individual who has assisted — or claims to have assisted — in the sale of real property.  But that person is not licensed as a real estate broker in Ohio.   Still, they want to be paid just as a Realtor would have been.  And they may even have an express agreement — even a written agreement — for payment of those sums.

But it is a defense — perhaps an absolute defense — under Ohio law against the payment of those sums if the party claiming payment does not allege and prove in a court action that they are a licensed real estate broker.  O.R.C §4735.21 provides, in pertinent part:

No right of action shall accrue to any person, partnership, association, or corporation for the collection of compensation for the performance of the acts mentioned in section 4735.01 of the Revised Code, without alleging and proving that such person, partnership, association, or corporation was licensed as a real estate broker or foreign real estate dealer.

The scenario is as follows: A party files a formal appeal of his property’s tax valuation before one of Ohio’s 88 Boards of Revision and then fails to appear to prosecute his case.  It would seem automatic that the case is dismissed, and the complainant would have no right of appeal.

But Ohio is unique in that new evidence can be presented before the Board of tax Appeals following a win or loss at the Board of Revision.  It’s not exactly a trial de novo, but it’s close.

Thus, the question recently before the Ohio Supreme Court was whether a complainant in that circumstance has the right to appear before the Board of Tax Appeals to challenge the Board of Revision dismissal, and still seek a reduction in valuation.

Prior precedent of the Ohio Supreme Court said definitively “no.”  LCL Income Properties v. Rhodes, 1995.  However, as Court News Ohio reports here, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision on July 2 in Ginter v. Auglaise County Board of Revision changes all that, and now the complainant will have a second bite at the apple at the Board of Tax Appeals.

The Wisconsin Appellate Law report has this entry about a recent Seventh Circuit decision that shows the precarious position lenders are in in recovering their losses arising from their loans.  As that article recites, in BB Syndication Services, INc. v. First American Title Insurance the Federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a construction lender does not have a claim against the title insurer for liens that arose as a result of their cutting off funds to the project.

The Seventh Circuit relied upon a provision in the title insurance policy excluding coverage for liens “created, suffered, assumed or agreed to” by the insured lender.

The Court found that because the liens arose as a result of the  lender cutting off funds to the project (thus causing the borrower to default in his obligations to subcontractors and material men, and then liens to be filed against the project), coverage did not lie.

 

We have a fantastic (if we do say so ourselves) 8-part series on legal issues on new construction for residential and commercial projects. The series, as a general proposition, provides helpful information for both contractors (builders) and buyers.

New construction: The problem of “what” is to be built >>

New construction: The “When” >>

New construction: Change orders, allowances and selections can significantly impact price >>

New construction: On whose land are you building? >>

New construction: Cost-plus versus fixed-price >>

New construction: What form of contract? >>

New construction: Ohio residential buyers absolutely protected from liens in limited circumstances >>

New construction: Properly documenting change orders >>

If we can help you “Make a Difference” with documentation of a new construction project, contact Isaac T. Heintz at (513) 943-6654.  For a dispute relating to a new construction project, contact Brad M. Gibson at (513) 943-6661.

We explore the issues of insurers and indemnitors in these two previous articles:

Navigating turbulent waters: Insurers and indemnitors (Part 1) >>

Indemnities and Warranty Deeds: Open-ended access to your checkbook >>

These blog entries primarily provide an understanding of indemnities from two different perspectives: That of the indemnitee (the person who is protected under an indemnity), and that of the indemnitor (the person providing the protection).

In this article, we explore multiple facets of the indemnity, and its enforcement.

As a starting point, in contractual indemnities, various terminology is used for risk-shifting provisions:

  • Indemnify
  • Defend
  • Hold harmless

These three terms, to us, have different meaning, but in application courts have interpreted them interchangeably, or at least to overlap.

  • “Indemnify” is an open-ended commitment to both cover the expenses of a third party claim and potentially to defend against that action, i.e., pay the the indemnity attorneys fees.
  • “Defend” more specifically covers that obligation to protect the first party from suits.  It probably does not include a broad indemnity for the underlying liability.
  • And “hold harmless” generally means simply that the second party will himself not raise a claim against the first party for certain claims, almost like a prospective release.  “Party B will hold Party A harmless from claims relating to the underground storage tanks on the property.”

But, because courts fail to make these fine-line distinctions, when drafting contract provisions perhaps more precision as to what is intended is in order.  In some instances, a party will provide all three protections: “Tenant will indemnify, defend and hold harmless Landlord from all claims relating to his occupancy of the property.”  Other times, it would be appropriate to tighten the scope of the risk-shifting provision: “Landlord has disclosed to Tenant the leaking roof on the property, and Tenant agrees to hold harmless Landlord against claims relating to the same.”

Because contractual risk-shifting provisions essentially provide open-ended access to a checkbook of the indemnitor, great care should be exercised in agreeing to such provisions.  For, even if a claim ultimately is unfounded, the cost to defend can bankrupt even well-capitalized parties.  Consideration also should be given to indemnities that must be personally signed, thus voluntarily piercing the corporate veil carefully constructed to protect the individual owners.

Today, for example, it is common for lenders to ask that individual investors in a real estate transaction personally indemnify and defend a lender against environmental risks associated with real property being financed.  Caution should be exercised in undertaking such an open-ended risk.  For, the very reason we advise clients to take title to property in the form of an LLC or corporation is to shield the individual form such open-ended liability.  An indemnity blows past that carefully-planned protection.

Finally, how is an indemnity or insurance provision enforced when the indemnitor or insurer chooses to ignore his contractual obligation?  This can be accomplished in one of two ways:

  1. At the time the claim is pending, the indemnitee can bring a “declaratory judgment” action asking the Court to declare that the indemnitor provide the promised protection.
  2. After the fact, as long as proper demand has been made previously for such a defense, a monetary damages claim can be brought to compensate indemnitee for the damages caused by indemnitor’s breach of his contractual obligation.

In many ways indemnities are “super” contract provisions because instead of defining specific contractual obligations (e.g., to make payments, to pay taxes, or to repair a roof) they protect against open-ended and sometimes unknown obligations, and indeed obligations from third parties who are foreign to the transaction being undertaken.

Whenever I review a contract, a lease, a mortgage or loan agreement, or other contractual agreement for a client, my antenna is raised when I read that my client is agreeing to “indemnify,” “defend,” “hold harmless,” “protect” or words of similar impact some other party. Those “super” contract provisions should be undertaken with due consideration to the impact on the indemnitor.

 

In perhaps the most audacious litigation gambit I have been involved with for a client, we resuscitated a failed Ohio Supreme Court case with a U.S. District Court action that rendered a favorable settlement for our client over…the elimination of his curb cut.

Curbs serve several purposes on a roadway: They are part of the storm water management system, moving water along a road’s edge into a storm sewer, and they operate as an important traffic control mechanism, whereby access onto roadways to and from individual properties is “regulated” by “curb cuts.”  A curb cut is the lowering or elimination of an otherwise continuous curb along a roadway, that is too high for traffic to traverse, to allow ingress and egress into private property.

Ohio has a long and rich tradition of allowing, as a constitutional right, access to one’s property through a curb cut onto a public road. See, e.g., OTR v. Columbus (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 203, 667 N.E.2d 8.

With that as background, in 1998 our client, Preschool Development Co., developed its property along S.R. 73 in Springboro, Ohio into a preschool.  It purchased a single family residence that enjoyed an existing curb cut onto S.R. 73, demolished the building, and proposed to build a new preschool there with direct access onto S.R. 73.  The City of Springboro at first conditioned zoning approval of the new development on a promise from the developer that when a new drug store was developed next door, we would close our curb cut onto S.R. 73, and access our property only through the drug store parking lot.  We objected, citing to the constitutional principle noted above.  Eventually, the owner reached a contractual agreement with the City that when the drug store parcel ultimately was developed, the owner would install, at its expense, a median in S.R. 73, thus preventing left turns into and out of the property, a reasonable compromise that allowed the development to go forward while at the same time improving traffic safety along S.R. 73.

As a side note, Ohio law provides, and we certainly believe, that municipalities can require anything they want to assure traffic safety along their roads.  But, if they are going to unconstitutionally burden a property to accomplish that, they simply must pay just compensation to the owner to achieve that end.  That is the law.

Fast forward 48 months and the new drug store parcel is being developed.  The City makes a renewed demand upon the property owner to close his curb cut and access his preschool parcel through the drug store parking lot.  We located and dusted off the agreement calling for a median in S.R. 73, instead, and the City persisted.  We resisted.

Finally, one fine July Monday morning, my client calls and informs me that, overnight, the City closed his curb cut by building a 6-inch curb in front of his property.  His only access to his property is across the drug store parcel.  Even worse, he has no legally-enforceable easement across the drug store parcel parking lot, meaning the City of Springboro has effectively land-locked his parcel and rendered it unmarketable.

Under constitutional principles, one is unable to sue a City directly for damages arising from a “taking,” but rather you sue the municipality –in what is called a mandamus action — to make them sue you for eminent domain – and establish judicially in that second proceeding the value of the property taken.  Under Ohio law, Plaintiffs have a choice for “mandamus actions,” to proceed initially and directly at the Common Pleas Court, the Court of Appeals, or at the Ohio Supreme Court.  Since the law and facts were clearly on our client’s side, we elected to take the case directly and initially to the Ohio Supreme Court.

So we proceeded in an original action at the Ohio Supreme Court for a mandamus requiring that the City “take” our client’s property and pay him just compensation for it.  As noted above, this action was supported by a long line of Ohio cases providing that a Curb Cut was a constitutionally-protected interest in Ohio that cannot be taken without just compensation.  We were certain the Supreme Court would grant the requested relief, and our client would be compensated for his loss.  This confidence was compounded by the fact that the “taking” was not just of a curb cut, but of all legal access to my client’s property – rendering it value-less.

Much to our surprise, the Ohio Supreme Court, in this 4-3 decision, denied our client’s requested relief. They essentially ignored 150 years of precedent on the topic – and the further defective easement rendering our client’s property worthless – in what we felt was a bad decision.  The problem was, that by electing to first go to the Supreme Court for our relief, there was no court to which we could appeal the decision.  In short, our client was stiffed.

But we were not content to rest on that outcome.  The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution provides that “private property” shall not be “taken for public use, without just compensation.”  Thus, again, the City, the State, have the right to take our client’s property (his curb cut access to S.R 73), but they must pay for it.  There is federal precedent that when the State’s courts refuse to provide a mechanism to provide that just compensation – in Ohio a mandamus action – one can avail themselves of a remedy directly in federal court.

As a huge bonus to our client, an award of attorneys fees is generally not available to a Plaintiff either for a mandamus action forcing the bringing of a condemnation action, or for the defense of the action to establish damages — thus making much of this litigation impractical if not impossible.  But when the State has effectively denied the Plaintiff any remedy for the taking, an action lies under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1988, which includes the right in the victorious Plaintiff to recover attorneys fees.  In a perverse way, the Ohio Supreme Court had done us huge a favor by making ripe our federal constitutional claims by denying the takings claim in State court.

Thus, we filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and drew knowledgeable Judge Arthur Spiegel.  Judge Spiegel was fantastic, from the first meeting of the litigants forward.  For, as a young attorney, he too was a real estate lawyer, and intuitively understood the principle that one has a property right in and to a curb cut, and was prepared to enforce that right.

The litigation was complex and arduous, with laborious motion work, discovery, expert witnesses, and hearings lasting more than a year.  The matter was complicated by issues of res judicata and issue preclusion, as well as the difficult-to-interpret, difficult-to-apply Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   Hundreds of hours were spent on briefing, and tens of thousands of dollars were invested on expert witness testimony.

In the end, we filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the question of liability.  The City filed a cross motion for summary judgment seeking essentially to extend and enforce the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court.  Judge Spiegel thankfully issued a decision – which we thought correct – granting partial summary judgment to the Plaintiff on the issue of liability.  Thus, we were headed to trial solely on the question of the value of the taking exacted by the City of Springboro.  It was a long-fought-for and sweet victory.

Facing that consequence — a trial solely on damages, where the City would have to pay Plaintiff’s attorneys fees, the City quickly settled – paying our client a fair amount for the “taking” and the full sum of all our client’s attorneys fees expended in the matter.

After five years of battle, the client was completely made whole.


Our deep knowledge of Ohio real estate law, combined with our extensive public interest law experience and incredible persistence and resilience, surely made a difference not only for this client, but to vindicate an important constitutional principle for all Ohioans.

Our firm is frequently called by buyers about claims relating to defects in real property, commercial and residential, after the closing.  They are disappointed that some aspect of the property or another is defective, and demand repairs paid by the seller.  Cracks in a concrete slab, mold, water leaks in plumbing, roofs and basements, and present or past termite infestation and damage are just a few of the common complaints.

The law on this topic is well-developed in Ohio.  Under Layman v. Binns and Traverse v. Long, the Ohio Supreme Court has clearly adopted the doctrine of caveat emptor, or “buyer beware.”  The Court has pronounced that buyers have no cause of action against a seller unless either (a) the defect was not discoverable upon a reasonable inspection and the seller knew about the defect or (b) the seller took steps to actively conceal or lie about the defect.

So, the Layman standard sets up a difficult factual challenge: a plaintiff must show that the damages were not reasonably discoverable by him on inspection, but on the other hand, as of the time of the litigation, the problems are so great that (a) the seller certainly knew about them and (b) they deserve significant recompense by the Court.  This is a vexing problem for every property defects plaintiff, commercial or residential.

The Layman case was decided in 1988, and then only a few years later the Ohio legislature affirmatively mandated for single family homes the use of the Ohio Residential Property Disclosure Form.  The current version of that form is here.

Because either affirmatively covering up a defect or making an affirmative misrepresentation can be the basis for liability under Layman, a misrepresentation on the Residential Property Disclosure Form can form the basis for liability under Ohio law.  Indeed, in our experience on property defects cases for residential properties, a mis-statement on a Residential Property Disclosure Form is the most common basis for these liability claims.

When pursuing a property defects claim, the plaintiff has several legal causes of action (i.e., bases under the law for suit).  These include breach of contact, misrepresentation and fraud.  Of these, only the fraud claim can be the grounds for recovery of attorneys fees and punitive damages, and our experience is that — even under that cause of action — state court judges in Ohio are extremely reluctant to arrive at liability including punitive damages and attorneys fees.  As such, a Plaintiff should enter into the litigation understanding that a “win” involving reimbursement of his fees invested in the case are unlikely.

In the commercial setting, where actual damages arising from the defect may be in the hundreds of thousands and millions of dollars, litigation may yield an economically positive outcome.  However, in the residential setting, buyers must carefully consider the cost-benefit of pursuing this litigation.  Conversely, a seller defending against such a claim may want to consider what he must invest in that defense, versus an early settlement.

Given that our firm’s objective for each matter assigned to us is to “make a difference” for the client, we carefully work with clients in property defects litigation to develop a strategy that is most likely to result in a net positive outcome for the client.