The Finney Law Firm is privileged to serve as co-counsel to the firm Graves Garrett from Kansas City, MO in the sole surviving case of Tea Party groups suing the Internal Revenue Service and others for illegal harassment and targeting.  You may read more about that here.

But Graves Garrett and its principals Todd Graves and Eddie Greim were also counsel for Wisconsin Club for Growth and its director, Eric O’Keefe, in important litigation to stop the illegal searches, seizures and prosecution in a “nearly three-year secret investigation that tried to muzzle conservative groups and cripple Governor Scott Walker.”

That work recently succeeded in a decision from the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordering that the investigation cease and that the prosecutors destroy copies of documents illegally obtained.

The Wall Street Journal recently praised that ruling in this editorial, and highlighted Graves Garrett’s role in bringing “the constitutional issues into focus.”  You may read that editorial here (behind the WSJ firewall).

Read Graves Garrett’s press release here.

Chris Finney joins distinguished Judge Patrick F. Fischer, from Ohio’s First District Court of Appeals, and Maurice Thompson, Executive Director of the 1851 Center for Constitutional Law, in a panel discussion before the Clermont Tea Party on August 4th on Judicial Activism: What is it and what can be done about it?  The event is 7 PM at the Holiday Inn in Eastgate  (4501 Eastgate Blvd, Cincinnati, OH 45245).

The Clermont Tea Party is organized by Ted Stevenot and Stuart Kennedy, and remains one of the largest regular gathering of Tea Party conservatives in Ohio if not the nation.  It has tremendous influence on politics in Clermont County.

The public is welcome.  Please join us.

 

 

In Wagner v. FEC, Wendy Wagner, a law professor who is working under a consulting contract for the Administrative Conference of the United States, sought to overturn a federal law prohibiting federal contractors from making contributions to federal candidates and their parties, so that she could make contributions to “candidates running for federal offices and/or their political parties.” Wagner argued that such a prohibition violates her First Amendment Rights.

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, ruling en banc, applied a heightened scrutiny (the State must demonstrate “a sufficiently important interest and employ a means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms”), a standard just below traditional First Amendment analysis (i.e. Strict Scrutiny, requiring a the state show a compelling governmental interest and the means must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest).

Using the “rigorous standard of review” set forth by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 29, the Court of Appeals distinguished the recent Citizens United case in which strict scrutiny was applied, stating that strict scrutiny was applied in Citizens United not because the case involved a ban on contributions, but because the case involved independent expenditures rather than contributions.

The Court found that there are two important governmental interests at stake: (1) protection against quid pro quo corruption and its appearance; and (2) protection against interference with merit-based public administration. The Court pointed to historical examples of bribery and pay to play schemes involving among others, Duke Cunningham of California, and Ohio’s Bob Ney; as well as testimony to the Watergate Committee from government contractors that they felt pressured to contribute – that their contracts were dependent upon the President’s re-election.

In determining that the restriction on political contributions during the time of contracting and performing under the contract, the Court found that the risk of corruption is greatest at such time. ”Unlike the corruption risk when a contribution is made by a member of the general public, in the case of contracting there is a very specific quo for which the contribution may serve as the quid: the grant or retention of the contract… a contribution made while negotiating or performing a contract looks like a quid pro quo, whether or not it truly is.“

Likewise, the risk that politicians would coerce contributions from employees or contractors is greater than coercion of the general public. “Because a contractor’s need for government contracts is generally more focused than a member of the general public’s need for other official acts, his or her susceptibility to coercion is concomitantly greater. And coercing a contractor to contribute, even if limited by a contribution ceiling, is still coercion. ”

Thus, federal employees and contractors must accept, in the D.C. Court of Appeals’ eyes at least, a limit on their First Amendment rights as part of the bargain.

In a case that has received some Internet attention, the Village of West Jefferson, Ohio, learned that commas still matter. You can read the Court of Appeals decision here.

Andrea Cammelleri woke up on Thursday evening, February 13, 2014 (she worked third shift) to find that her pickup truck – that had been parked in front of her home –  was missing. She called 911 to report the vehicle stolen, only to be informed that the car wasn’t stolen, it was impounded. It seems that the Ms. Cammelleri had parked her truck in the same spot for more than 24 hours, in violation of a Village Ordinance:

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to park or leave standing upon any street, road, thoroughfare or highway in the Village, any motor vehicle camper, trailer, farm implement and/or non-motorized vehicle for a continued period of twenty-four hours except on weekends and holidays, at which the time shall be seventy-two hours.

Ms. Cammelleri and her attorney argued that the ordinance is ambiguous, she parked a pickup truck and the ordinance refers only to “any motor vehicle camper, trailer, farm implement and/or non-motorized vehicle” The trial court, in convicting Ms. Cammelleri, found that it is obvious that a comma is missing between “motor vehicle” and “camper” and everyone understands that the ordinance is intended to apply to “motor vehicles” or “campers,” and that therefore, it is illegal in the Village of West Jefferson to park a pickup truck in the same spot for more than 24 hours.

Ms. Cammelleri, however, refused to accept that the grammar lessons we had all been taught as children no longer mattered. She took her case to the Court of Appeals.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals determined that (a) because of the missing comma, the statute is ambiguous; and (b) applying the normal rules of statutory interpretation, the statute, as written, does not apply to Ms. Cammelleri’s pickup truck. Her conviction was thus overturned.

While not directly on point, we are hopeful that this case will lead to a resurgence of the Oxford Comma.

 

More than 99% of all petitions to the United States Supreme Court are rejected, meaning that the petitioner’s claims are never heard by the High Court.

In 2014, we were fortunate to have two cases — of about 100 in total addressed by the Court —  accepted.  And then we then won each by 9-0 decisions authored by Justice Clarence Thomas.   Inasmuch as this was the inaugural year of our new firm, this was an exceptional honor.

As we wrote here, we asked the U.S. Supreme Court to consider a third case this year — Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights.  In that case we filed what we refer to as a “me too” petition before the U.S. Supreme Court, one addressing issues otherwise before the Court, in this case Reed v. Town of Gilbert, AZ, which was heard by the Justices in oral argument by the Court back in January.

We could not say after the Court’s initial conference that the case had been accepted or rejected — rather they just held it in abeyance.

Last week, they ruled in favor of Reed in the Arizona litigation, vindicating the First Amendment rights of the petitioner in a case involving content discrimination by the Town of Gilbert as to yard signs.  Today, they issued their ruling in the Wagner case and ruled in favor of our client, Frank Wagner.  Wagner had been cited criminally by the City of Garfield Heights for placing a 4′ x 4′ sign in his yard critical of his city council member.

The case has now been sent back to the 6th Circuit for further consideration in light of the Reed decision.  You may read the SCOTUS order here.

OK, we keep talking about it, but in reality “nothing” has happened yet with the Frank Wagner v. Garfield Heights case at the U.S. Supreme Court.

We filed the case and said it had issues that tracked the U.S. Supreme Court case of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, AZ.  And the Supreme Court agreed with that proposition, refusing to dismiss the case a the first conference, where 99% of all petitions die.  But neither did they accept the case.  It just was put on a pile “to be considered later.”

On Monday, the Town of Gilbert, AZ case was decided in favor of the Plaintiffs, and free speech, the same side as the Wagner case, advancing the issues on which we had won at the trial Court in that case.  Thus, if the U.S. Supreme Court follows its precedent set this week, we should “win” a third time in 18 months at the U.S. Supreme Court. Nothing is guaranteed, but the signs all look good.

Well, that “later” for Wagner is this Thursday.  And we are hopeful the result of that conference will be a big “Reverse and Remand” to the 6th Circuit.

We’ll keep you advised.

 

In perhaps the most audacious litigation gambit I have been involved with for a client, we resuscitated a failed Ohio Supreme Court case with a U.S. District Court action that rendered a favorable settlement for our client over…the elimination of his curb cut.

Curbs serve several purposes on a roadway: They are part of the storm water management system, moving water along a road’s edge into a storm sewer, and they operate as an important traffic control mechanism, whereby access onto roadways to and from individual properties is “regulated” by “curb cuts.”  A curb cut is the lowering or elimination of an otherwise continuous curb along a roadway, that is too high for traffic to traverse, to allow ingress and egress into private property.

Ohio has a long and rich tradition of allowing, as a constitutional right, access to one’s property through a curb cut onto a public road. See, e.g., OTR v. Columbus (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 203, 667 N.E.2d 8.

With that as background, in 1998 our client, Preschool Development Co., developed its property along S.R. 73 in Springboro, Ohio into a preschool.  It purchased a single family residence that enjoyed an existing curb cut onto S.R. 73, demolished the building, and proposed to build a new preschool there with direct access onto S.R. 73.  The City of Springboro at first conditioned zoning approval of the new development on a promise from the developer that when a new drug store was developed next door, we would close our curb cut onto S.R. 73, and access our property only through the drug store parking lot.  We objected, citing to the constitutional principle noted above.  Eventually, the owner reached a contractual agreement with the City that when the drug store parcel ultimately was developed, the owner would install, at its expense, a median in S.R. 73, thus preventing left turns into and out of the property, a reasonable compromise that allowed the development to go forward while at the same time improving traffic safety along S.R. 73.

As a side note, Ohio law provides, and we certainly believe, that municipalities can require anything they want to assure traffic safety along their roads.  But, if they are going to unconstitutionally burden a property to accomplish that, they simply must pay just compensation to the owner to achieve that end.  That is the law.

Fast forward 48 months and the new drug store parcel is being developed.  The City makes a renewed demand upon the property owner to close his curb cut and access his preschool parcel through the drug store parking lot.  We located and dusted off the agreement calling for a median in S.R. 73, instead, and the City persisted.  We resisted.

Finally, one fine July Monday morning, my client calls and informs me that, overnight, the City closed his curb cut by building a 6-inch curb in front of his property.  His only access to his property is across the drug store parcel.  Even worse, he has no legally-enforceable easement across the drug store parcel parking lot, meaning the City of Springboro has effectively land-locked his parcel and rendered it unmarketable.

Under constitutional principles, one is unable to sue a City directly for damages arising from a “taking,” but rather you sue the municipality –in what is called a mandamus action — to make them sue you for eminent domain – and establish judicially in that second proceeding the value of the property taken.  Under Ohio law, Plaintiffs have a choice for “mandamus actions,” to proceed initially and directly at the Common Pleas Court, the Court of Appeals, or at the Ohio Supreme Court.  Since the law and facts were clearly on our client’s side, we elected to take the case directly and initially to the Ohio Supreme Court.

So we proceeded in an original action at the Ohio Supreme Court for a mandamus requiring that the City “take” our client’s property and pay him just compensation for it.  As noted above, this action was supported by a long line of Ohio cases providing that a Curb Cut was a constitutionally-protected interest in Ohio that cannot be taken without just compensation.  We were certain the Supreme Court would grant the requested relief, and our client would be compensated for his loss.  This confidence was compounded by the fact that the “taking” was not just of a curb cut, but of all legal access to my client’s property – rendering it value-less.

Much to our surprise, the Ohio Supreme Court, in this 4-3 decision, denied our client’s requested relief. They essentially ignored 150 years of precedent on the topic – and the further defective easement rendering our client’s property worthless – in what we felt was a bad decision.  The problem was, that by electing to first go to the Supreme Court for our relief, there was no court to which we could appeal the decision.  In short, our client was stiffed.

But we were not content to rest on that outcome.  The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution provides that “private property” shall not be “taken for public use, without just compensation.”  Thus, again, the City, the State, have the right to take our client’s property (his curb cut access to S.R 73), but they must pay for it.  There is federal precedent that when the State’s courts refuse to provide a mechanism to provide that just compensation – in Ohio a mandamus action – one can avail themselves of a remedy directly in federal court.

As a huge bonus to our client, an award of attorneys fees is generally not available to a Plaintiff either for a mandamus action forcing the bringing of a condemnation action, or for the defense of the action to establish damages — thus making much of this litigation impractical if not impossible.  But when the State has effectively denied the Plaintiff any remedy for the taking, an action lies under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1988, which includes the right in the victorious Plaintiff to recover attorneys fees.  In a perverse way, the Ohio Supreme Court had done us huge a favor by making ripe our federal constitutional claims by denying the takings claim in State court.

Thus, we filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and drew knowledgeable Judge Arthur Spiegel.  Judge Spiegel was fantastic, from the first meeting of the litigants forward.  For, as a young attorney, he too was a real estate lawyer, and intuitively understood the principle that one has a property right in and to a curb cut, and was prepared to enforce that right.

The litigation was complex and arduous, with laborious motion work, discovery, expert witnesses, and hearings lasting more than a year.  The matter was complicated by issues of res judicata and issue preclusion, as well as the difficult-to-interpret, difficult-to-apply Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   Hundreds of hours were spent on briefing, and tens of thousands of dollars were invested on expert witness testimony.

In the end, we filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the question of liability.  The City filed a cross motion for summary judgment seeking essentially to extend and enforce the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court.  Judge Spiegel thankfully issued a decision – which we thought correct – granting partial summary judgment to the Plaintiff on the issue of liability.  Thus, we were headed to trial solely on the question of the value of the taking exacted by the City of Springboro.  It was a long-fought-for and sweet victory.

Facing that consequence — a trial solely on damages, where the City would have to pay Plaintiff’s attorneys fees, the City quickly settled – paying our client a fair amount for the “taking” and the full sum of all our client’s attorneys fees expended in the matter.

After five years of battle, the client was completely made whole.


Our deep knowledge of Ohio real estate law, combined with our extensive public interest law experience and incredible persistence and resilience, surely made a difference not only for this client, but to vindicate an important constitutional principle for all Ohioans.